Tugrul Keskin, rising voice on global politics, explores Türkiye's prospects amid Israel's wars; outlines AI's political-economy role for the next decade
Thoughtfox reached out earlier this week to Dr. Tugrul Keskin, a globally recognized Turkish academic currently affiliated with Cappadocia University, to seek his insights into Türkiye's geopolitical prospects in regard to the ongoing Israeli attacks into Lebanon and Palestine, and the rising tensions between Israel and Iran. Recipient of the Shanghai Project of Global Talents scholarship, Dr. Keskin previously served as a professor and director of the Center for Global Governance at Shanghai University—and has taught at several other institutions in the United States and Türkiye; he is also the founding editor of Brill’s Sociology of Islam journal, and the founder and moderator of the ‘Sociology of Islam’ and ‘Global China’ academic networks.
On behalf of Thoughtfox, the interview was conducted, via email and Facebook Messenger, through September 28-October 6, 2024 by Dr. Piyush Mathur. The interview draft was slightly edited for clarity, flow, and conformity with Thoughtfox style. The penultimate draft of Dr. Keskin’s responses was approved by him before being published.
Dr. Tugrul Keskin
Mathur: This interview has a specific line of inquiry, as the ensuing questions will indicate; however, given that you are a globally minded political analyst and theorist, I have to ask you two general questions also. Out of those two questions, I would start out with one right away—while leaving the other for the end.
This is the first general question: How close are we, if we are close at all, to a bona fide Third World War? (An associated query, of course would be this: Would it require a full-scale nuclear attack for much of the world- at-war to call out a Third World War?)
Keskin: The question of how close we are to a potential Third World War (WW III) is a complex one, shaped by various global political, military, and economic tensions. While we are not currently on the brink of a conflict on the scale of WWI or WWII, several factors point to an increased risk of widespread geopolitical instability that could escalate into a larger, more violent confrontation. Today’s world is facing regional conflicts with global ramifications, such as the Ukraine-NATO-Russia standoff, rising tensions between China and Taiwan, instability in the Middle East, and the increasing prevalence of cyber and hybrid warfare.
What would define WWIII? Historically, the World Wars have involved multiple major powers across different continents, engaging in prolonged, large-scale combat. Some argue that we are already witnessing a form of ‘global conflict’ through proxy wars, economic struggles, and cyberattacks. However, for a conflict to be fully recognized as WW III, it would likely require simultaneous military engagements across regions such as Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. A direct military confrontation between major powers like the U.S., China, and Russia would be a key indicator of such a war. Historically, the World Wars have caused long-term, widespread destruction, not only to military forces but also to civilian populations, economies, and infrastructure on multiple continents.
I believe that while we are experiencing heightened tensions and frequent regional conflicts, a Third World War is not yet inevitable. A conflict of this scale would not necessarily require the use of nuclear weapons to be recognized, although nuclear escalation could serve as a tipping point. The ongoing rivalries among major powers, economic competition, and the evolution of warfare—cyber, hybrid, and even space warfare—have put the world in a precarious situation. The crucial question is whether these tensions can be managed without crossing the threshold into a full-scale global conflict.
In the near future, we are likely to see an escalation of certain conflicts—such as the Ukraine-NATO standoff with Russia, tensions between China and Taiwan, instability in the Middle East, and the rise of cyber and hybrid warfare—unless Trump is re-elected.
Mathur: Are you suggesting that the former US President Donald Trump's re-election would prevent a Third World War? If yes, what makes you say so?
Keskin: Yes, I am suggesting that. The others (or the liberal establishment) are a part of the military-industrial complex. If you watch news interviews with Trump or J.D. Vance (his Vice Presidential candidate), you will notice that these two individuals are political outsiders. They are not part of the D. C. beltway. They are also viewed—particularly in regions like Appalachia, the Southeast, and the Midwest—as representing everyday Americans who have faced poverty, economic inequality, and exclusion.
Mathur: It is an intriguing, certainly counterintuitive insight overall, I suppose; I can’t say that it is meritless—especially given how the Biden-Harris regime has been handling the Israel-Palestine-Iran situation—but I can’t say, also, that I could conclusively agree with it. One would have to carefully build up speculative steps (which you just might have, in your own thinking, over the course of years) that Trump might take regarding the rising conflicts before concluding that they should lead us away from a Third World War specifically (which nobody currently has claimed to want anyway); moreover, that speculative exercise would have to establish a linkage with the status of a Trump-Vance team as a Beltway outsider. I mean, this stance on your part is a bit tricky to validate—but nor could it be dismissed outright.
Türkiye within the context of the unfolding turmoil in the Levant
Mathur: Now on to the specific questions. Türkiye is not the most powerful player in the Levant, but it is also not without influence. Given its limitations, and Israel's apparent inflexibility, how has Türkiye fared so far regarding the atrocious situation that has been unfolding in Israel's neighborhood since October 7, 2023?
Keskin: Since the terrorist attack into Israel on October 7, 2023, Turkey has been vocal in its condemnation of the conflict and Israel's military actions, while strongly advocating for Palestinian rights. Influenced by his Pan-Islamism stance, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has positioned Turkey as a firm critic of Israeli policies, particularly its military actions in Gaza. This stance aligns with the long-standing support for the Palestinian cause among Turkey's Islamist circles, but it also highlights the limits of Türkiye's influence both regionally and globally.
Erdoğan’s Turkey’s rhetorical influence is more impactful domestically and in parts of the Muslim world; the country faces considerable geopolitical constraints in converting that rhetoric into meaningful influence on the ground.
Mathur: How does Türkiye view Hezbollah’s position in this conflict, and what role might Türkiye play in supporting Lebanon as Israel escalates its pursuit of Hezbollah?
Keskin: Turkey's stance on Hezbollah and its role in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict is shaped by broader geopolitical interests in the Middle East, its relationship with Lebanon, and its aim to maintain regional stability while balancing ties with both Arab states and Israel. However, Turkish foreign policy has increasingly leaned towards Pan-Islamism, shifting away from a focus on peaceful coexistence—a trajectory that may pose risks for the country’s future.
Turkey's primary goal is to prevent a prolonged conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, which could destabilize Lebanon, escalate regional tensions, and complicate its relations with key players like Iran, Israel, and Arab states. By playing a more active diplomatic role and offering humanitarian aid, Turkey seeks to expand its regional influence while maintaining its image as a neutral mediator. This balancing act enables Turkey to project itself as a stabilizing force in the Middle East, enhancing its soft power amidst the complexities of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.
‘Turkey seeks to prevent the total breakdown of Lebanon’s state institutions, as increased instability could lead to larger refugee flows and regional chaos.’
— Dr. Tugrul Keskin —
Turkey’s view on Hezbollah involves several key factors, such as diplomatic caution, concerns about Lebanon’s stability, and a non-interference approach to sectarian conflicts. Seeking to maintain a balanced position in its relations with both Israel and the wider Arab world, Turkey generally takes a cautious stance toward Hezbollah—recognizing it as a significant political and military actor in Lebanon but refraining from endorsing its military actions against Israel. Furthermore, Turkey is deeply concerned about Lebanon's stability. An intensified conflict between Israel and Hezbollah could further destabilize Lebanon, a country already grappling with economic collapse and political fragmentation.
Turkey seeks to prevent the total breakdown of Lebanon’s state institutions, as increased instability could lead to larger refugee flows and regional chaos. While sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, Turkey avoids becoming overly entangled in Hezbollah’s Shia-based sectarian politics, positioning itself as a Sunni-majority state advocating for unity within the Muslim world.
Possible impact of the Israel-Hezbollah war on the Kurdish issue for Türkiye
Mathur: Could the unfolding conflict between Israel and Hezbollah complicate Türkiye's own regional security concerns, particularly with regard to the Kurdish issue in neighboring Syria and Iraq?
Keskin: Yes, the escalating conflict between Israel and Hezbollah could complicate Turkey's regional security concerns, particularly regarding the Kurdish issue in Syria and Iraq. Several factors play a role, including regional instability, shifting alliances, Turkey's diplomatic role, international distractions, and the risks posed by refugee flows. I believe that while Turkey has long-standing concerns about Kurdish autonomy movements in Syria and Iraq, a deeper Israel- conflict could make it harder for Turkey to address these issues. The overall security situation in the region would become more unpredictable and volatile.
‘Key figures in Turkish foreign policy—such as Erdoğan and Hakan Fidan (the Minister of Foreign Affairs)—might not want to see a widespread regional war, as it could lead to direct U.S. involvement in the region.’
— Dr. Tugrul Keskin —
As the Israel-Hezbollah conflict intensifies, it could destabilize the wider Middle East, drawing attention away from Turkey's main concerns, such as the activities of Kurdish groups in Syria and Iraq. This could give these groups more room to operate or strengthen their control in contested areas like northeastern Syria or the Sinjar region in Iraq. Turkey is managing complex alliances with the U.S., Russia, China, and regional actors like Iran. A prolonged conflict between Israel and Hezbollah (backed by Iran) could change the power dynamics and impact Turkey's security. Iran's involvement in Lebanon and Syria may also affect northern Syria, where Turkey is focused on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which it sees as an extension of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). Key figures in Turkish foreign policy—such as Erdoğan and Hakan Fidan (the Minister of Foreign Affairs)—might not want to see a widespread regional war, as it could lead to direct U.S. involvement in the region.
Türkiye’s prospective outreach to other Muslim-majority nations regarding the deepening crisis in the Levant
Mathur: Erdoğan has often positioned himself as a defender of Islamic causes globally. How might Türkiye attempt to rally support from other Muslim-majority nations regarding the Israel-Lebanon crisis?
Keskin: Erdoğan has consistently positioned himself and Turkey as defenders of Islamic causes on the global stage, particularly in advocating for Palestinian rights and promoting Muslim solidarity. In the context of the Israel-Hezbollah-Lebanon crisis, Turkey's strategy for rallying support from other Muslim-majority nations may involve a blend of diplomatic efforts, humanitarian aid, and public outreach.
It’s important to remember that Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (JDP) previously had close ties with the neo-conservative Israeli lobby in Washington, D.C., to help advance the Greater Middle East Initiative. This initiative led to regime changes and conflicts across the region, including in Yemen, Syria, Libya, and Iraq. Erdoğan and the JDP were actively involved in this strategic regional reshaping. However, Turkey and the U.S. now have divergent objectives. While Erdoğan seeks to replace secular Arab nation-states with Sunni, Muslim Brotherhood-aligned governments, the U.S. has broader objectives that extend beyond simply supporting Israel. These differences highlight a growing divide in their strategic goals in the Middle East.
‘While Turkey has the second-largest military in NATO and has shown a willingness to intervene militarily in places like Syria and Libya, any military involvement in the Israel-Palestine or Lebanon conflicts would be risky, given the involvement of global powers like the U.S. and Russia, as well as regional actors such as Iran.’
— Dr. Tugrul Keskin —
Erdoğan could publicly call for support from Turkish citizens and organizations to send relief aid to Lebanese civilians affected by the crisis, positioning Turkey as a protector of Muslim populations. Turkey has significant media outlets—like the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT)—that can amplify pro-Lebanon, anti-Israel narratives across the Muslim world. These campaigns could invoke historical grievances against Israeli policies and appeal to Muslim unity. Erdoğan has historically used public speeches and mass rallies to garner domestic and international support. He may deliver passionate speeches that invoke the Palestinian cause and call for solidarity with Lebanon, appealing to Muslim populations worldwide. Turkey could rally Muslim-majority nations by criticizing Western nations, particularly the United States, for their perceived support of Israel. Erdoğan may highlight the double standards in international relations and position Turkey as a defender of Muslim interests against Western hegemony.
Pan-Islamism plays a crucial role in Turkey’s evolving foreign policy, not only in the Middle East but also in Central Asia, East Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and the U.S. Erdoğan may invoke the idea of broader Islamic unity, emphasizing the need to defend fellow Muslims in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. This rhetoric could resonate with countries such as Indonesia, Pakistan, and others that share a Pan-Islamic vision. Erdoğan could use the current crisis to reinforce Turkey’s leadership within the Muslim world, positioning the country as a defender of the global Islamic community (Ummah) and presenting himself as a prominent figure in Islamic diplomacy. Examples of this trend can be seen in Turkey’s stance on issues like Kashmir or Mali, with Turkish universities and the Directorate of Religious Affairs playing key roles in promoting this Pan-Islamist foreign policy.
Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates are fully aware of Turkey’s new approach in the region. Some of these Muslim-majority nations, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have pursued normalized relations with Israel in recent years. Erdoğan may seek to engage these nations diplomatically by highlighting humanitarian issues and appealing to shared Islamic values, aiming to encourage a stronger stance against Israel. Through these efforts, Turkey could enhance its role as a key player in the Muslim world, advocating for Lebanon and potentially gaining greater political and symbolic influence among Muslim-majority nations, even as Turkey becomes more authoritarian domestically.
Türkiye’s stance on the Israeli approach and its potential impact on its relations with NATO & China
Mathur: How might Türkiye's opposition to Israel's actions affect its relations with its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), particularly the U.S., and with China, which has growing interests in the Middle East?
Keskin: Erdoğan’s Pan-Islamic approach presents risks for a middle-power country like Turkey, which faces significant economic, social, and political challenges domestically. Turkey's opposition to Israel's actions, particularly in the context of the ongoing conflict with Palestine, carry potential consequences for its relations with its NATO allies as well as China, each with different interests in the Middle East.
An outspoken stance against Israel's policies, especially in relation to Palestine, often places Turkey at odds with the U.S., which is a staunch ally of Israel. This could cause friction, especially when Turkey's rhetoric or actions diverge sharply from NATO’s collective positions. This tension could exacerbate existing disagreements between the U.S. and Turkey over issues such as Syria, human rights, and Turkey's purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems. But Turkey has also been seeking to re-establish her relations with the US military and lobbying inside the beltway; so far it has not been successful. However, for now, despite these tensions, Turkey remains a key NATO ally due to its strategic location and military capabilities. The U.S. and other NATO members may be reluctant to escalate the situation too much, as they need Turkey's cooperation on broader security matters, such as counterterrorism and managing the refugee crisis stemming from the Middle East.
‘…Turkey’s opposition to Israel could strengthen Turkey’s ties with China—especially if they collaborate more closely on international fora where both seek to limit U.S. dominance.’
— Dr. Tugrul Keskin —
China's approach to the Middle East is largely driven by its economic and strategic interests, particularly its Belt and Road Initiative and energy security. China typically maintains a neutral position on Middle Eastern conflicts, advocating for dialogue and stability while steering clear of direct confrontation with either Israel or its Arab neighbors. Turkey's opposition to Israel’s actions might resonate with China, as both countries frequently criticize Western interventionism and emphasize state sovereignty. Turkey and China also share a common scepticism toward U.S. influence in the region, and Turkey’s critical stance on Israel could align with China’s broader vision of a multipolar world order.
Their points of convergence aside, Turkey and China do not fully trust each other on political, social, or economic grounds. China is very sceptical about Turkey’s new Pan-Islamist foreign policy in Central Asia and among Uyghurs; moreover, China's growing economic relationship with Israel, including cooperation in areas like technology and infrastructure, could limit how closely it aligns with Turkey on this issue. China might seek to maintain a balanced approach, engaging with both Israel and Muslim-majority countries to safeguard its broad regional interests. Nonetheless, Turkey’s opposition to Israel could strengthen Turkey’s ties with China—especially if they collaborate more closely on international fora where both seek to limit U.S. dominance.
Turkey’s opposition to Israel could lead to increased tensions with the U.S. and some NATO members, but it is unlikely to severely damage NATO cohesion, given Turkey’s strategic importance. Meanwhile, China may find opportunities to deepen its ties with Turkey through shared critiques of Western policies, but will likely maintain a careful balancing act given its own interests in the region.
Türkiye’s energy interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and its choices through the unfolding war in the Levant
Mathur: Could Türkiye's economic ties to the region, including energy interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, shape its response to the conflict? How would a prolonged war between Israel and Hezbollah affect Türkiye's economic goals?
Keskin: Turkey's economic ties to the Middle East, particularly in energy, will play a crucial role in shaping its response to conflicts such as the one between Israel and Hezbollah. Turkey has long-standing ambitions to become a regional energy hub, especially regarding natural gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. Disputes over maritime borders and gas fields, particularly with Cyprus and Israel, have already caused tensions in recent years. A prolonged conflict involving Israel could disrupt ongoing or potential gas exploration projects, pipelines, and energy collaborations. Stability in the region is essential for Turkey to pursue these objectives, and a war could jeopardize both its economic and geopolitical ambitions.
Turkey is strategically positioned for future pipelines that could transport Eastern Mediterranean gas to Europe. A conflict involving Israel and Lebanon could complicate pipeline security and planning, forcing Turkey to reassess its alliances and energy strategy in the region. Any disruption to supply routes or infrastructure could slow Turkey’s aspirations to become an energy transit hub, undermining its economic strategy. While Turkey has complex diplomatic relations with Israel, it maintains significant trade with the country. A war involving Lebanon, a country where Turkey also has influence, would force Ankara to navigate a delicate balancing act. Prolonged conflict could increase political pressure on Turkey to pick sides or act as a mediator, potentially affecting trade flows and investments depending on its stance.
‘Already hosting millions of Syrian refugees, Turkey could face additional pressure on its domestic resources and economy if refugees from Lebanon arrive, diverting attention from longer-term economic goals such as energy development and trade.’
— Dr. Tugrul Keskin —
The Middle East is a vital market for Turkish exports, and a prolonged conflict could lead to broader regional instability, which would likely hinder Turkey’s economic ambitions in neighboring countries. Disruptions in Eastern Mediterranean energy plans and the ripple effects on neighboring economies could significantly harm Turkey’s regional economic goals. Additionally, a conflict between Israel and Lebanon could worsen refugee flows into Turkey, adding to its economic strain. Already hosting millions of Syrian refugees, Turkey could face additional pressure on its domestic resources and economy if refugees from Lebanon arrive, diverting attention from longer-term economic goals such as energy development and trade.
In summary, Turkey’s economic response would likely prioritize safeguarding its energy interests and maintaining regional stability, but it would need to navigate the conflict carefully, balancing its economic ambitions with political realities.
Türkiye’s constructive potential through the rising crisis in the Levant
Mathur: How would you assess and characterize Türkiye’s potential for success as a constructive force within the fast-degenerating Israel-Palestine-Lebanon-Iran-Yemen situation? Does the geopolitical situation allow enough room for Türkiye in that regard under Erdoğan, whose term ends in 2028 and whose party and its allies have lost some power via local elections held in March this year?
Keskin: Under Erdoğan, Turkey has sought to position itself as a key regional power, aiming to mediate and influence Middle Eastern conflicts through a pro-Muslim Brotherhood stance, but its success is contingent on several factors. Turkey has historically supported Palestinian causes, and Erdoğan’s vocal criticism of Israeli policies gives Turkey credibility in parts of the Arab world. However, Turkey restored diplomatic relations with Israel in 2022, which requires balancing this stance. Turkey’s ability to mediate may depend on maintaining these renewed ties while continuing to advocate for Palestinian rights.
In Lebanon, Turkey’s influence is more limited compared to that of Iran, which backs Hezbollah. Turkey would need to carefully navigate Lebanon’s complex sectarian politics, and its Sunni-majority identity could hinder its role in mediating between Hezbollah and other factions. Iran’s significant influence in Lebanon, Yemen, and its close ties to Palestinian resistance movements, particularly Hamas, means that Turkey would need to engage with Iran constructively. However, Turkey and Iran are regional rivals with differing visions for the Middle East, especially regarding Syria and Iraq, though they also share economic and diplomatic interests that could foster cooperation.
In Yemen, Turkey’s involvement has been minimal, and its leverage in that conflict is much smaller compared to that of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran. Nevertheless, Turkey’s economic and strategic ties to the Gulf could present opportunities for mediation efforts, particularly as Gulf states may seek diversified diplomatic partnerships in the future.
Erdoğan’s declining local power, as demonstrated by his party's and allies' losses in the March 2024 local elections, could impact Turkey’s foreign policy direction. With his term set to end in 2028, Erdoğan may prioritize securing his legacy by asserting Turkey’s role as a regional powerbroker. However, internal political pressures and potential instability could divert attention from foreign policy initiatives. The electoral losses might embolden opposition forces, which tend to prioritize domestic economic issues over Middle Eastern interventions. Turkey’s economic challenges, including high inflation, currency struggles, corruption, and nepotism, limit its ability to project power abroad.
Energy interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly in partnerships with countries like Israel and Lebanon, could also shape Turkey’s approach to regional conflicts. Balancing these economic needs with its political ambitions in the region will be a delicate task. While Turkey has the second-largest military in NATO and has shown a willingness to intervene militarily in places like Syria and Libya, any military involvement in the Israel-Palestine or Lebanon conflicts would be risky, given the involvement of global powers like the U.S. and Russia, as well as regional actors such as Iran.
Turkey’s strategic position within NATO offers some leverage, especially if Western powers view it as a potential mediator in Middle Eastern conflicts. However, strained relations with the West—particularly the U.S. and EU—over issues like human rights, Syria, and ties with Russia could limit Turkey’s influence.
Although Turkey holds certain advantages, including its geographic location, NATO membership, and historical role as a bridge between the West and the Muslim world, several constraints remain: Turkey’s relationships with key regional actors (Iran, Israel, and the Gulf states) are characterized by both cooperation and rivalry, complicating its ability to act as a neutral mediator. Additionally, internal political instability and economic challenges may push Erdoğan’s government to focus more on domestic affairs, reducing its diplomatic reach. Turkey will also face competition from other regional and global powers like Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S., who have a vested interest in managing these conflicts.
Artificial Intelligence in the global political economy through the next decade
Mathur: You have co-edited the collection of essays Towards an International Political Economy of Artificial Intelligence (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021)—one of the earliest, pathbreaking books interlinking Artificial Intelligence (AI) with global geopolitics and geo-economy. Given the situation that has been unfolding in Israel's neighbourhood since October 7, 2023—including the interactions between Israel and Iran (and keeping in mind the backdrop of the mostly paralleling Russia-Ukraine situation)—how do you suppose AI would play into the global political economy through the next 10 years? Let's not forget here the demands that AI makes on energy, water resources.
Keskin: The intersection of AI with the global political economy, especially in regions marked by complex geopolitical tensions such as Israel-Iran and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, is expected to evolve significantly in the coming decade. AI will not only function as a tool for economic development and defence but also intensify existing geopolitical rivalries, becoming further entrenched in global politics. Several key factors will shape this evolution, including geopolitical and geoeconomic rivalries, strain on energy and water resources, AI’s role in global supply chains and economic sanctions, as well as ethical, socioeconomic, and climate-related challenges.
AI’s influence on the global political economy, particularly in conflict zones like Israel's region and the Russia-Ukraine theatre, will be profound. It will serve as both an engine for economic growth and a weapon in geopolitical conflicts, enhancing military capabilities, reshaping economic power structures, and potentially worsening resource and climate-related disputes. The competition for AI dominance will escalate, particularly among technologically advanced nations—while those with limited access to AI technology will face increasing disadvantages. The critical challenge will be to harness AI’s vast potential while managing its ethical, environmental, and geopolitical consequences.
‘Countries like the U.S., China, and Israel, with substantial investments in AI, will gain a competitive edge in influencing global markets, while others, like Iran, will face challenges due to resource constraints and sanctions that hinder their AI progress.’
— Dr. Tugrul Keskin —
AI will also play a crucial role in the technological arms race among nations. Conflicts like Israel-Iran and Russia-Ukraine illustrate the growing reliance on AI-powered technology for defence, surveillance, cyber warfare, and intelligence. Israel, already a leader in AI, especially in military applications like autonomous drones and cybersecurity, will continue to push the boundaries of AI-driven defence systems. Iran, although trailing in AI development, is focusing on AI-enhanced cyber warfare capabilities. Meanwhile, Russia, under the strain of international sanctions and isolation, has turned to AI to bolster military capabilities and enhance economic resilience, particularly in sectors like energy.
AI will further intensify the militarization of conflicts, placing greater emphasis on cyber-warfare and automated defence systems in geopolitical struggles. Technologies like automated surveillance, precision targeting, and deep fakes will enable states to engage in asymmetric warfare, allowing non-state actors or nations with limited conventional power to use AI to exert influence far beyond their traditional capabilities.
Nations leading in AI development will shape not only military power but also exert control over global economic systems. AI is crucial in driving innovation in sectors such as biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, finance, and energy. Countries like the U.S., China, and Israel, with substantial investments in AI, will gain a competitive edge in influencing global markets, while others, like Iran, will face challenges due to resource constraints and sanctions that hinder their AI progress.
AI systems, particularly those that rely on large-scale data processing like machine learning and neural networks, consume vast amounts of energy and water. In conflict-prone regions such as the Middle East, where water is already scarce, the infrastructure needed for AI will place additional pressure on these critical resources.
In nations rich in fossil fuels, like Russia and Iran, AI development may become more closely linked to energy geopolitics. As AI becomes essential to industries ranging from finance to agriculture, countries that control energy resources will have a significant advantage in advancing AI technologies. Russia’s role as a major energy supplier could provide leverage for its AI investments, although sanctions and international isolation may limit its technological progress.
‘Iran, heavily sanctioned and largely cut off from accessing cutting-edge AI technologies, is forced to rely on underground or alternative methods—a situation that stands to widen the technological gap between it and Israel, which boasts a thriving tech and AI sector.’
— Dr. Tugrul Keskin —
In the Middle East, the energy demands of AI could intensify existing resource conflicts. Both Iran and Israel, dealing with resource-management challenges in harsh climates, may need to prioritize efficient energy use to support AI systems, further tying national security to technological advancement. AI could also be used to manage water resources through predictive analytics and precision agriculture, but the energy and water requirements for AI infrastructure could lead to unsustainable consumption, exacerbating regional instability.
The global supply chain for AI technology—encompassing semiconductors, rare earth metals, and advanced machinery—is set to become a new arena of competition. Iran, heavily sanctioned and largely cut off from accessing cutting-edge AI technologies, is forced to rely on underground or alternative methods—a situation that stands to widen the technological gap between it and Israel, which boasts a thriving tech and AI sector.
Over the next decade, AI is likely to exacerbate inequalities both within and between nations. Wealthy, technologically advanced countries will gain from economic growth, military dominance, and diplomatic leverage, while nations unable to invest in AI—due to sanctions, resource shortages, or lack of infrastructure—will experience widening disparities.
Climate change will also shape the development and use of AI. While AI technologies could play a critical role in mitigating climate change by optimizing energy use, managing water resources, and predicting environmental disasters, the high energy demands of AI systems could also contribute to environmental strain.
Mathur: Thank you, Dr. Keskin, for your rather substantial answers to my longish questions! Your answers will certainly inform, educate Thoughtfox readers (just as much as I have benefited from them).
Keskin: Thank you for giving me the opportunity for this interview. I liked your questions.
Dr. Piyush Mathur is a moderator, observer, analyst, and entrepreneur all rolled into one; above all, though, he likes to learn and to bring together other learners, from a wide range of disciplines and walks of life, toward more enlightened planes of collective existence. If you need to contact him to engage any of his aforementioned services, drop us a message here. He also offers textual and tutorial services, via Textall, though they are mostly unaffordable to mere mortals.
You can also check out Dr. Mathur’s following publications, which might interest the readers of the above interview: Technological Forms and Ecological Communication: A Theoretical Heuristic (Lexington Books, 2017); ‘Understanding post-Covid-19 global politics: A tentative theoretical framework’ (2020); and ‘Anti-China conspiracy theorist has amplifiers in India’s media; a new low pertains to spreading false rumours regarding Nijjar’s murder’.
See this list also that he maintains: Key video-based material in English on the Israel-Palestinian history